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ABSTRACT  
How do we assess how happy we are? One theory is that we compare life-as-it- is with 
standards of how-life-should-be. In this view, happiness emerges from a cognitive 
evaluation that draws on socially constructed standard of the good life. Another theory 
holds that we rather infer happiness on the basis of how well we feel most of the time. In 
that view, happiness is an unreasoned affective experience that roots in the gratification of 
universal human needs. One question that emerges from this discussion is whether these 
are really independent ways of evaluating life. If so, a next question is what their relative 
weight is in the evaluation. These questions are addressed at the nation level using data of 
the Gallup World Poll over the years 2006–2010. This survey in 127 nations involves not 
only a question on overall life satisfaction, but also a more cognitively focused question on 
how close one’s life is to the best possible and a series of questions on yesterday’s mood. 
Analysis of average scores in nations shows that mood and contentment are much inter-
twined, but also add to overall life satisfaction independently, the former more than the 
latter. 
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1   INTRODUCTION 
 
 Happiness is highly valued in present day society. Not only do people aim at happiness in 
their own life, but there is also support for the idea that we should care for the happiness of 
other people and that governments should aim at creating greater happiness for a greater 
number of citizens (Bentham 1789). This classic philosophy is not only more accepted these
days, but also more practicable, now that scientific research provides more view on the 
conditions for happiness (Veenhoven 2010a). 
  In that context, happiness is commonly understood as a subjective appreciation of 
one’s life as a whole. A central element in this definition is subjective ‘appreciation’ that is 
also referred to as ‘evaluation’, ‘liking’ and ‘satisfaction’. These words refer to a state of 
mind, but leave some ambiguity about the precise nature of that state. It can be cognitive 
evaluation as well as affective experience. 
  Different theories of happiness stress diffe rent variants of appreciation. Comparison 
theory sees it as a cognitive judgment involving an estimate of the difference between actual 
and ideal life. Affect theory sees happiness rather as an estimate of how well one feels 
usually. The first author of this paper has elaborated the former view in his Conceptual 
referent-theory of happiness Rojas (2005, 2007) and Rojas and Vitterso (2010) and the 
second author has elaborated on the latter view in his Need-theory of ha ppiness (Veenhoven 
1991, 2009, 2010b). 
  This begs the question about the reality value of these theories. Do they apply at all,  
and if so, do they apply equally well or does one apply better than the other? Below we will 
first take a closer look at the concept of happiness and next review each of the above 
mentioned theories in more detail. 
 
 
1.1    Views on happiness 
What goes on in the mind when we assess how much we appreciate the life we live? A review 
of the various definitions reveals that some see that as a cognitive evaluation, while others see 
it as reading off affective experience. 
 
1.1.1 Cognitive definitions 
McDowell and Newell (1987: 204) describe life-satisfaction as a ‘‘Personal assessment of 
one’s condition compared to an external reference standard or to one’s aspirations’’. 
Likewise, Shin and Johnson (1978: 478) define life-satisfaction as a ‘‘global assessment of a 
person’s quality of life according to his chosen criteria’’.
Some of the definitions in this line stress the active achievement of life goals (e.g. 
Annas 2004), while others rather stress the absence of unfulfilled aspirations, e.g. Schmittz 
(1930: 234) who depicted happiness as: a ‘‘… state of being without desires’’. In all 
conceptualizations happiness is deemed to be higher, the smaller the gap between standard 
and reality. 
 
1.1.2 Affective definitions 
Several definitions depict happiness rather as an affective phenomenon. For instance 
Wessman and Ricks (1966: 240/1) wrote: ‘‘Happiness appears as an overall evaluation of the 
quality of the individual’s own experience in the conduct of his vital affairs. As such, 
happiness represents a conception abstracted from the flux of affective life, indicating a 
decided  balance or positive affectivity over long periods of time’’. In a  similar vein Fordyce 
(1972: 227) states ‘‘Happiness is a particular emotion. It is an overall evaluation made by the 
individual in accounting all his pleasant and unpleasant experiences in the recent past’’. 
These definitions are close to Jeremy Bentham’s (1789) famous definition of happiness as 
Mariano Rojas, Ruut Veenhoven 2 Contentment and affect in the estimation of happiness
‘‘the sum of pleasures and pains’’, which also involves the notion of an ‘affect balance’. A 
contemporary variation on this theme is proposed by Daniel Kahneman’s (2000) in the notion 
of ‘objective happiness’, which is the ‘raw’ affective experience that underlies the overall 
evaluation of life. 
 
1.1.3 Mixed definitions 
Several definitions combine these two elements. For instance Diener defines ‘Subjective 
Well-Being’ (SWB) as being satisfied with life (cognition), while feeling good (affect) 
(Diener et al. 1997: 25). The two components are also involved in Chekola’s (1974: 
2002) definition of happiness as ‘‘… realization of a life-plan and the absence of seriously 
felt dissatisfaction and an attitude of being displeased with or disliking one’s life’’. 
Likewise Sumner (1996: 145/6) describes ‘being happy’ as ‘‘… having a certain kind of 
positive attitude toward your life, which in the fullest form has both a cognitive and an 
affective component. The cognitive aspect of happiness consists in a positive evaluation of 
your life, a judgment that at least on balance; it measures up favorably against your standard 
or expectations… The affective side of happiness consists in what we commonly call a 
sense of well-being, finding your life enriching or rewarding or feeling satisfied or fulfilled 
by it’’. 
 
 
1.1.4  Veenhoven’s conceptualization of ‘Overall’ Happiness and ‘Components’ 
 In this line, Veenhoven (1984: 22–32) distinguishes between ‘overall’ happiness and 
‘components’ of happiness assuming that the latter function as ‘sub-totals’ in the overall 
evaluation of life. 
 
Overall happiness is defined as ‘‘the degree to which an individual judges the overall 
quality of his life-as-a-whole favorably’’. Thus defined happiness appears as an attitude 
towards one’s own life. This attitude is seen to draw on different sources of information, 
called ‘components’ of happiness. One source of information is estimates of how well we 
live up to standards of the good life and another source of information is how well we feel 
affectively. 
 
Hedonic level of affect  We experience different kinds of affects: feelings, emotions and 
moods and these experiences have different dimensions, such as active–inactive and 
pleasant–unpleasant. That latter dimension is called ‘hedonic tone’. When we assess how 
well we feel we typically estimate the pleasantness in feelings, in emotions, as well as in 
moods. Veenhoven calls this ‘hedonic level of affect’ and this concept fits the above 
mentioned ‘affective’ definitions of happiness. This concept does not presume subjective 
awareness of that average level. One can feel good most of the time, without being fully 
aware of that. Therefore this concept can be applied to beings who cannot reflect on their 
own life, such as animals and little children. 
 
Contentment Unlike animals and little children most adults can also evaluate their life with 
the use of reason and compare life-as-it-is with notions of how they want life-to-be. The 
degree to which an individual perceives his wants to be met is called ‘contentment’ by 
Veenhoven and this concept equals the above mentioned ‘cognitive’ definitions of 
happiness. This concept presupposes that the individual has developed some conscious 
wants and has formed an idea about their realization (Fig. 1).  
 
1.2    Theories of how we evaluate life 
These different definitions of happiness fit different theories about how we evaluate life, 
and these theories are typically part of a wider concept of man. 
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1.3    Cognitive theories 
Cognitive theories hold that happiness is a product of human thinking and as such roots in 
social constructions. Notions of how life should be are assumed to root in collective beliefs 
and to vary across cultures. Likewise, appraisals of how well life meets up to these 
standards are seen to be ‘constructed’ in the social discourse. This view on happiness is 
dominant in philosophy and also pervades the thinking of many social scientists. 
 
Comparison  
The theory assumes that we have ‘standards’ of the good life and that we constantly weigh 
the reality of our life against these standards. Different theories stress different standards. In 
the variant of life-time comparison the focus is on whether we are doing better or worse 
than before. In that view a happy youth will not add to happiness in adulthood. The social 
comparison variant stresses how well we are doing relative to other people, and in particular 
to people like us. In that view happiness is surpassing the Jones. Several of these theories 
are combined in Michalos’(1985) ‘Multiple Discrepancies Theory’ of happiness, which 
assumes that we not only compare with what we want and with what others have, but also 
with what we think we need and with what we deem fair. 
 
Social construction 
The idea that we compare to standards begs the question of where these standards come 
from. This is typically seen as an outcome of socialization, involving the adoption of 
collective notions of the good life, sometimes with minor modifications. These collective 
notions of the good life are seen as ‘social constructions’ that draw heavily on the wider 
culture and shared history. In this line some sociologists argue that happiness as such is also 
a social construction. In that view, happiness is a culturally variable concept, comparable to 
the notion of ‘beauty’. 
 
Adjustment of standards 
Standards of comparison are presumed to be variable rather than fixed and to follow 
perceptions of possibilities. In other words: we would tend to judge life by what we think it 
can realistically be. Improvement of living conditions will therefore  instigate  higher  
aspirations  and  steady  social  progress  is  even  believed  to debouch in an ‘inflation of 
aspirations’. In this view we are on a ‘hedonic treadmill’ (Brickman and Campbell 1971). 
 
Reflected appraisal 
A sociological variant holds that we not only compare our life to own standards, but that we 
also appraise our life through the eyes of others, in other words, that in assessing how happy 
we are, we estimate how happy other people think we are. If so, this enhances the salience 
of shared standards of the good life. This theory is summarized in Fig. 2. 
 
1.4    Affective Theories 
Affect theory holds that happiness is a reflection of how well we feel generally. In this view 
we do not ‘calculate’ happiness, but rather ‘infer’ it, the typical heuristic being ‘‘I feel good 
most of the time, hence I must be happy’’ (Schwarz and Strack 1991). In this line of 
thought, one question is how we take stock of our affective experience. Another question is 
what makes us feel good or bad and this links up to the wider question about the functions 
of affect. 
 
Frequency of affect 
It would seem that the overall evaluation of life is geared by the most salient affective 
experiences and that these are typically intense affects. This view is common in fiction and 
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is more or less implied in life-reviews. In than line Bentham (1789) assumed that happiness 
comes from the sum of pleasures and pains weighted by intensity and duration. Yet research 
using the Experience Sampling Method shows that duration matters more than intensity, 
overall life-satisfaction being predicted by the relative frequency of positive to negative 
affect and not by the intensity of affects (Diener et al. 1991). 
 
Mood as informant  
How do we assess that relative frequency? The cognitive view on affect procession suggests 
that we compute an affect balance in some way, using estimates of how often we feel good 
or bad. A competing view is that this occurs automatically and that the balance reflects in 
mood. In this view mood is an affective meta-signal that, contrary to feelings and emotions, 
is not linked to specific objects. Emotions denote an affective reaction to something and 
prepare the organism to a response, while mood informs about the overall condition of the 
organism without preparing for specific action. 
 
Gratification of needs  
Why do we feel good or bad at all? Probably because that informs us about how well we are 
doing. Affects are an integral part of our adaptive repertoire and seem to be linked to the 
gratification of human needs. ‘Needs’ are vital requirements for functioning, such as eating, 
bonding and exercise. Nature seems to have safeguarded the gratification of these needs 
with affective signals such as hunger, love and zest. In this view, positive mood signals that 
all needs are sufficiently met at the moment. 
 ‘Needs’ in this theory should not be equated with ‘wants’ in the above discussion of 
cognitive theories. Needs are inborn and universal while ‘wants’ are acquired and can be 
variable across cultures. Wants can concur more or less with needs. 
 
1.4.1 Motivation to Act 
In this view, negative and positive mood function as red and green lights on the human 
machine, indicating either that there is something wrong or that all systems are functioning 
properly. If so, this is likely to have behavioral consequences, negative mood urging to 
cautions and positive mood encouraging going on. This is what Fredrickson (2004) denotes 
as the ‘broadening’ effect of positive affect. This theory is summarized in Fig. 3. 
 
 
1.5 Research Questions 
How well do these conc epts and theories fit reality? Are cognitive and affective appraisals 
really different? Can we feel good most of the time, but still think of our life as sub- 
standard? Or can we think that we live the best possible life but still feel depressed? 
Several scholars would deny that. Cognitive accounts of affective experience assume that 
we feel good because we com pare well (e.g. Oatley 1992). Reversely there are claims that 
cognitive comparison is driven by affective experience, for example that we select standards 
of comparison that make sense of how we feel (e.g. Wessman and Ricks 1966:110). In these 
views, cognition and affect are two sides of the same evaluative coin. 
 In this study we assess (1) to what extent cognitive and affective evaluations of life 
vary independently, if so, (2) whether their correlation to overall happiness differs, an if so 
(3) whether the cognitive component has more weight (as predicted by the first author) or 
the affective component (as predicted by the second author). 
 
 
1.6 Earlier Research 
Research findings on inter-correlation of the different kinds of happiness are gathered in the 
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World Database of Happiness (Veenhoven 2011a). The collection ‘Measures of Happiness’ 
of that database (Veenhoven 2011b) involves a systematic classification of measures of 
happiness based on the above distinction between overall happiness (code O), hedonic level 
of Affect (code A) and contentment (code C). Observed correlations between scores on 
measures of that kind are listed in the finding report ‘Happiness: Correspondence of 
different measures’ (Veenhoven 2011c) which contained near to 200 such findings in June 
2011. 
 
Micro level 
Most of these findings concern correspondence of responses to questions about different 
kinds of happiness by the same individuals. Of these findings 7 are about similarity between 
scores on measures of hedonic level (A) and on measures of contentment (C).1  The average 
correlation is +0.45.2  A similar average (+0.44)  appears in 35 findings on correspondence 
between scores on measures of contentment (C) and overall happiness (O).3 Lastly 147 
findings are about the correspondence between hedonic level of affect (A) and overall 
happiness (O).4 The average correlation is slightly larger in this case, r = + 0.48. So no 
difference at first sight. 
 Yet, the correlation between scores on measures of hedonic level (A) and of overall 
happiness (O) is probably an underestimation of the true correspondence of these happiness 
variants. One reason is that most measures of hedonic level are based on recent affective 
experience (last 2 week, today), which is more variable than satisfaction with life-as-a- 
whole. A second reason is that the response format is quite different, most measures of 
hedonic level are multiple item affect balance scales while overall happiness is typically 
measured using single questions . Consequently we see a larger correlation in the eight 
studies that measured both hedonic level (A) and overall happiness (O) with similar 
questions on how one generally feels; r = +0.63 in that case. 
 All these studies were done in western nations, and only half among general 
population samples. Unfortunately none of these 196 studies involved measures of all three 
happiness variants. 
 
Macro level 
Only one of the findings is at the macro level of nations and reports a correlation of  +0.72 
between life-satisfaction (O) and affect-balance in 39 nations. 
 
Multi level 
One multi-level study that compared within-nation correlations at the micro level across 
nations at the macro level. Within person correlations between hedonic level (A) and overall 
life-satisfaction (O) appeared to be stronger in  individualistic nations than in collectivistic 
societies (Suh et al. 1998: 485–486). 
 
 
2  METHOD 
 
In this study we address the question at the macro level, comparing average scores on each 
of these three variants of ha ppiness in nations. We use data obtained in the Gallup World 
Polls over the years 2006–2010, which cover 127 nations (see ‘‘Appendix’’). 
 The Gallup W orld Poll draws on representative samples of the general public in 
countries. The sample size in each of the nations is about 1,000 persons. The program aims 
at repeated surveys over time and for that reason several countries are surveyed more than 
once between 2006 and 2010. In these cases we use average scores, which consequently 
draw on samples of 2000 or more. Since 2006 the core questionnaire involved questions on 
all three variants of happiness. 
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 This data set is unique in that it contains measures of all three happiness variants. 
Unfortunately it allows only analysis at the m acro level of nations. One reason is that the 
micro data are not av ailable, at least not at a price we could pay. Another reason is that 
affective experience is m easured using yesterdays mood, which does not reliably indicate 
how individuals typically feel. 
 
2.1      Variables 
The first Gallup World Poll in 2005 involved both a question on contentment and a series of 
questions on current affect. In 2006 a question on life-satisfaction was added. These 
questions read as follows: 
 
2.1.1    Overall Happiness: Question on Life Satisfaction (O-SL) 
 All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? 
 
0 dissatisfied 
. 
. 
10 satisfied 
This question invites to a global evaluation of one’s life and is therefore coded ‘O’ for 
Overall happiness’.5  Since the term ‘satisfaction with life’ is used the sub-code of this 
question is ‘  SL’ from ‘Satisfaction with Life’. This item is similar to the standard question 
on life satisfaction used in the World Values Survey. The only difference is in the range of 
response options, which is 1–10 in the World values Survey and 0–10 in this Gallup World 
Poll. 
 
2.1.2   Contentment: Question on Best-Worst Possible Life (C-BW) 
Here is ladder representing the ‘ladder of life’. Let’s suppose the top of the ladder represents 
the best possible life for you; and the bottom, the worst possible life for you. On which step 
of the ladder do you feel you personally stand at the present time? 
 
10 best possible 
. 
. 
0 worst possible life 
In this question the focus is not on ‘satisfaction’ with life, but on how close life is to 
the‘best possible’. In other words, the question is about the gap between life-as-it-is and 
perceptions of how-life-could-be. As such, the question invites to a comparison with notions 
of ideal life and such notions root in collective representations rather than in personal 
experience. For these reasons this question is classified as tapping ‘contentment’.6 
This item is known as the ‘Cantril ladder’. It was developed by Kilpatrick and Cantril 
(1960) and has since been used in several cross-national studies. 
 
2.1.3   Affect Balance: Questions On How One Felt Yesterday (A-AB) 
The Gallup World Poll also includes a battery of questions about m ood in the previous day. 
These questions have a binary answer: ‘yes’ or ‘no’. 
 Did you experience the following feelings during A LOT OF THE DAY yesterday? 
How about. 
 
            -   Enjoyment?          (a) 
       -   Physical pain?         (b) 
           -   Worry?         (c) 
           -   Sadness?           (d) 
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            - Stress?                         (e) 
           - Anger?                        (f) 
           - Depression?                 (g) 
         -  Love?                         (h) 
 
Now please think about YESTERDAY, from the morning until the end of the day. Think of 
where you were, what you were doing and how you felt. 
 
- Did you feel well rested yesterday?                    (i) 
- Did you smile or laugh a lot yesterday?              (j) 
       - Did you learn or do something interesting yesterday? (k) 
       - Would you like to have more days just like yesterday?  (l) 
      - Were you proud of something you did yesterday? (m) 
      - Were you treated with respect all day yesterday? (n) 
 
 
The focus on affective experience is not only in the wording of the questions, but also in the 
time frame. Reference to yesterday implies that the question is on effective experience and 
not on cognitive judgment of life. 
 From the responses we computed an affect balance score. To that end we first 
computed the percentage of ‘yes’ answers to the questions on positive affect in each nation. 
We summed the percentage yes answers to the questions a, h, i, j, k, l, m and n and divided 
that sum by 8. Next we computed the percentage of yes answers to questions about negative 
affect b, c, d, e, f, g and divided that sum by 6. As a last step we subtracted the latter mean 
of negative affect from the former mean of positive affect. 
 This affect balance score does not measure hedonic level of affect of individual 
persons adequately, since yesterday’s mood does not always correspond with how well one 
feels most of the time. Yet this battery can be used for measuring hedonic level in 
aggregates, such as nations, since individual variations balance out in big samples. 
 The focus of this measure is clearly on affective experience. It is therefore coded A of 
Affect with the sub-code AB of Affect Balance.7 
 
2.2  Pattern of Responses 
How are these questions answered in the various nations? Central tendencies are presented 
in Table 1. Life satisfaction ranges from 8.50 in Costa Rica to 2.62 in Togo while 
Contentment varies from 8.00 in Denmark to 3.24 in Togo. In all nations the percentage of 
positive feelings tends to be greater than the percentage of negative feelings and hence all 
scores on affect balance are positive. The highest score is observed in Latin American 
countries such as Panama, Venezuela, Paraguay and Costa Rica, as well as in Kenya, where 
the degree to which positive feelings outweigh negative feelings is above 60 percentage 
points. The lowest score is in Ethiopia with a positive balance of only 11 percentage points. 
 
 
2.3      Inter-Correlations 
Table 2 provides the correlation coefficients between the variables. It is observed for the 
zero-order correlations that there is a very high correlation between life satisfaction and 
contentment (+0.85). The correlation between life satisfaction and affect is relatively lower, 
but still strong (+0.51). It is also interesting to observe that contentment and affect balance 
are positively correlated (+0.42) which means that feeling good and being contented with 
life tend to go together. 
 Contrary to common practice we do not report statistical significance, since this set of 
nations is not a probability sample.8 
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3         CONTENTMENT AND AFFECT IN NATIONS 
 
Our first research question was about the difference between cognitive and affective 
appraisals of life. If these are just two sides of the same coin, we can expect an almost 
perfect correlation between our measures of contentment and affect. If they represent 
different appraisals, there will also be correlation, since the same life is being judged, but 
less than perfect correlation. 
 In Table 2 we have seen that the zero-order correlation between average contentment 
and average affect balance in nations appears is considerable (r = +0.42),  but far from 
perfect and clearly less than the correlation between contentment and overall life-
satisfaction. Why is the correlation not stronger? The scattergram on Fig. 4 provides some 
clues. 
 The first thing that catches the eye is that there is much dispersion, rather than a 
concentration around the regression line, we see a cloud. 
 A second noteworthy thing is that the cloud is not symmetric, we see quite some 
countries in the upper left section, but the right bottom section is empty. This means that 
high affect can co-exist with low contentment, but that low-affect and high contentment 
does not.9  This could mean that affective experience sets a bottom line. 
 
3.1  Consonant Clusters 
Affective experience and cognitive contentment go together in most of the countries. 
Beginning left at the bottom of Fig. 4, we see five countries where low affect is 
accompanied with low contentment. These countries are Georgia (GE), Haiti (HT), Ethiopia 
(ET), Sierra Leone (SL), and Armenia (AM), all cases of recent upheaval and facing very 
low socio-economic conditions. 
 In the middle of Fig. 4 are countries where medium affect goes together with medium 
contentment. In this section we see former communist countries such as Russia (RU) and 
Poland (PL) as well as China (CN) and South Africa (ZA). 
 In the upper right segment are some more Latin American nations, e.g. Mexico (MX), 
Costa Rica (CR) and Venezuela (VE), together with European nations, such as Denmark 
(DK), Norway (NO), Netherlands (NE), Finland (FE) and Sweden (SE) Ireland (IE) as well 
as Canada (CA). 
 
 
3.2  Deviant Clusters 
Let us now take a closer look at the deviations, since these denote independent variation in 
affective experience and cognitive contentment. Beginning at the top-left of Fig. 4 the first 
question is whether there is something common to the countries where low contentment 
goes together with high affect. These are typically African countries, such as Mali (ML), 
Kenya (KE), Malawi (MW), Niger (NE) and Ghana (GH). 
 Moving to  the  right  in  the  top  segment of  Fig. 4  the  next  question is  about  the 
countries where high affect goes together with medium contentment. These are typically 
Latin American nations, such as Paraguay (PY), El Salvador (SV) and Panama (PA). 
 The last deviant cluster is in the middle of the bottom section of Fig. 4, where 
medium and high contentment goes together with low affect. These are typically situated in 
the Middle East, e.g. Yemen (YE), Azerbaijan (AZ), Palestine (PS) Iran (IR) and Lebanon 
(LB). A bit higher in this cluster are also former communist countries, such as Moldova 
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(MD), and India (IN) and Pakistan (PK). Israel (IL) is a case of high contentment and 
relatively low affect. 
 The existence of these deviant cases supports the view that two components of 
happiness are not just two sides of the same coin, but involve different estimates that do not 
always concur. Moreover the existence of recognizable clusters in these cases shows that 
the observed deviations are no random fluctuations. 
 
 
4  ROLE OF AFFECT AND CONTENTMENT IN EXPLAINING  LIFE 
SATISFACTION 
 
The second question is about the relative weight of these appraisals in the overall 
evaluation of life. Are these weights about equal? If not, does cognitive comparison 
dominate in line with Rojas’ conceptual referent theory of happiness? Or does affect prevail 
as predicted by Veenhoven’s need theory of happiness? 
 The zero-order correlations in Table 2 suggest a greater role of the cognitive 
component, the correlation between overall life-satisfaction and contentment being +0.85, 
while the correlation between life-satisfaction and affect balance is +0.51. 
 Partial correlation analysis also suggests that cognitive appraisals dominate. The 
partial correlation between life satisfaction and contentment is hardly reduced when affect 
balance is partialled out (rp = +0.81). On the other hand, the correlation between life 
satisfaction and affect balance is much reduced when contentment is controlled, rp = +0.31.  
This picture is confirmed in a regression analysis. See Table 3. 
 Models 1  and  2  practically  repeat  the  information presented in  Table 2;  they are 
introduced in Table 3 for comparison purposes. Model 1 depicts the explanatory power of 
affect on life satisfaction. An increase in the country’s affective situation is accompanied by 
a raise in life satisfaction, and affect explains about 26% of the variability in life 
satisfaction. Model 2 studies the explanatory power of contentment on life satisfaction. The 
estimated coefficient is positive and large: on overage a raise of 1 standard deviation in 
contentment increases life satisfaction in 0.84 standard deviations. What is probably more 
relevant for our purpose, contentment alone explains about 71% of the variability in life 
satisfaction. 
 Model 3 incorporates both contentment and affect in the analysis. It is found that the 
coefficient of contentment does remain close to the one estimated in Model 2, while the 
coefficient of affect substantially declines with respect to the one estimated in Model 1. 
Furthermore, a comparison of Models 3 and 2 shows that affect plays a marginal role in 
explaining life satisfaction once contentment is taken into consideration (the R2  of Model 3 
is only 0.03 higher than the R2  of Model 2). On the other hand, a comparison of Model 3 
and Model 1 shows that the capacity of explaining life satisfaction triples when contentment 
is added to a model which already incorporates affect as an explanatory variable (The R2  
raises from 0.26 to 0.74). These analyses suggest that in making an overall assessment of 
their life people’s contentment substrate plays a larger role than their affective substrate. 
 
 
5  DISCUSSION 
 
 
5.1      Difference Between Cognitive and Affective Evaluations of Life 
The first question was whether cognitive and affective assessments really differ. The data 
show that they are related, yet different. Though average scores go together in about half of 
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countries, they diverge considerably in the other half of the cases. The data also show that 
there is system in the divergence. 
 The most notable finding is that there are no countries where people are contented in 
spite of feeling miserable, while there are quite some countries where people feel good, 
while being discontented. Apparently, affective experience dominates cognitive evaluation 
when affect is low. This suggests primacy of affect; comparable with Zajonc’s (1984) 
observation that feeling precedes cognitive judgments. In this case that primacy seems to 
occur only when the balance of affect is close to zero. In terms of Veenhoven’s need theory 
of happiness this would mean that affective signals get stronger relatively when need 
gratification approaches a critical minimum and overrule different cognitive appraisals in 
such cases. 
 The observed patterns of divergence can be interpreted in this context. The 
combination of high affect and low contentment in African countries can then be seen to 
mean that basic human needs are fairly well met in these societies, though living conditions 
fall short to western standards, which dominate views on the ‘best possible life’. The same 
reasoning can apply to the Latin American nations, where western standards are likely to be 
more prominent.  In  this  context  the  combination  of  low  affect  and  medium  
contentment observed in the Middle East means that need gratification is poor in these 
societies, in spite of the fact that they do less bad with respect to meeting local standards of 
the good life. These regional differences are discussed in more detail in Brule´ and 
Veenhoven (submitted). 
 
5.2  Relation with Overall Happiness 
Veenhoven’s Need-theory holds that affective experience dominates the overall evaluation 
of life, while Rojas’ Conceptual referent-theory predicts that cognitive evaluation will be 
more important. The data of this study support Rojas’ view. Table 2 shows a stronger 
correlation between life-satisfaction and contentment than between life-satisfaction and 
affect balance, both in zero-order correlations and in partial correlations. Results  from  
Table 3  do  also  corroborate  this  view;  contentment  has  much  greater power  than  
affect  balance  in  explaining  the  variability  in  life  satisfaction  across countries. 
 So it seems that people’s comparisons to standards —which may have a social or 
cultural substrate—, have considerable importance when assessing their satisfaction with 
life. Goals and evaluation norms may differ across cultures and even across persons, and 
they may be socially influenced. 
 Still this is not the last word. An alternative explanation for the stronger correlation 
between life-satisfaction and contentment is that the questions used are quite similar. Firstly 
there is similarity in the content of the questions; many respondents may not have fully 
appreciated the difference between ‘satisfaction with life’ and closeness to the ‘best possible 
life’. Secondly, the 0–10 numerical rating scales are identical. On the other hand, the 
measure used for assessing hedonic level of affect differs both in content and in response 
format. 
 These possible method effects cannot be tested as yet. Further research should apply 
more focused measures of contentment, for instance first having respondents list the main 
things they want from life and next have them rate how well these wants are met.10  The aim 
would be to have a measure of contentment with more texture and equally distinct from life 
satisfaction as the measure of affect used here. Such measures of contentment have been 
used at the individual level, but not yet at the nation level. Another option is to frame 
questions on all three variants of happiness in the same format, e.g. ‘Please rate on this 0–10 
scale (a) how pleasant you feel most of the time, (b) how well you are doing in getting the 
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 things you want from life and (c) how satisfied you are with your life-as-a-whole these 
days’. In that context one could also ask respondents to what extent they agree with 
statements such as ‘I am in good mood most of the time, though I am not very successful in 
getting what I want from life’. 
 
 
6  CONCLUSION 
 
Affective and cognitive appraisals of life do not always parallel. The evaluations differ in 
about half of the nations of the present day world and the most common divergent 
combination is high affect with low contentment. Cognitive evaluation seems to dominate in 
the overall evaluation of life. 
 
 
Appendix 
 
See Table 4. 
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 Fig. 1  Happiness and its components 
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 Fig. 2  Cognitive theory of how happiness is assessed 
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 Fig. 3  Affect theory of how happiness is assessed 
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Fig. 4  Scatter plot of affect balance and contentment in 127 nations 
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Table 1  Basic statistics for life satisfaction, contentment and affect balance 
 
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
Coefficient of 
variation 
Countries 
with highest 
values 
Countries with 
lowest values 
Satisfaction 5.91 1.30 0.22 Costa Rica (8.50) Zimbabwe (3.05) 
O-SL 
   Puerto Rico (8.32) 
Denmark (8.24) 
Benin (3.02) 
Burundi (2.94) 
    Switzerland (8.02) 
Finland (7.89) 
Tanzania (2.82) 
Togo (2.62) 
Contentment 5.45 1.14 0.21 Denmark (8.00) Cambodia (3.63) 
C-BW 
   Finland (7.61) 
Netherlands (7.56) 
Georgia (3.62) 
Benin (3.52) 
    Norway (7.46) 
Switzerland (7.45) 
Chad (3.44) 
Togo (3.24) 
Affect balance 
A-AB 42.9 11.6 0.27 
Panama (64) 
Venezuela 
(64) 
Yemen (20) 
Palestine (20) 
    Paraguay (64) Georgia (20) 
    Kenya (63) 
Costa Rica (61) 
Armenia (18) 
Azerbaijan (17) 
     Ethiopia (11) 
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Table 2  Correlation matrix: zero order (left bottom) and partial correlations (right top) 
 
 Life satisfaction      Contentment                    Affect balance 
Life satisfaction 1 0.81 0.31 
Contentment 0.85 1 -0.02 
Affect balance 0.51 0.42 1 
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Table 3  The role of contentment and affect in explaining life satisfaction: regression analyses 
 
 
 Model 1   Model 2   Model 3  
 Standardized coefficient Prob. > t 
 Standardized 
coefficient Prob. > t 
 Standardized 
coefficients Prob. > t 
Affect balance 0.512 0.00 
    
0.191 0.00 
  Contentment 
   0.843 0.00  0.762 0.00 
R2 0.263 
  
0.718 
  
0.740 
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Table 4  List of 127 countries/autonomous territories 
 
Albania Ecuador Lebanon Saudi Arabia 
Algeria Egypt Lithuania Senegal 
Angola El Salvador Macedonia Serbia 
Argentina Estonia Madagascar Sierra Leone 
Armenia Ethiopia Malawi Singapore 
Australia Finland Malaysia Slovak Republic 
Austria France Mali Slovenia 
Azerbaijan Georgia Mauritania South Africa 
Bangladesh Germany Mexico Spain 
Belarus Ghana Moldova, Republic of Sri Lanka 
Belgium Greece Montenegro Sweden 
Benin Guatemala Morocco Switzerland 
Bolivia Haiti Mozambique Taiwan 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Honduras Nepal Tajikistan 
Botswana Hong Kong Netherlands Tanzania 
Brazil Hungary New Zealand Thailand 
Bulgaria India Nicaragua Togo 
Burkina Faso Indonesia Niger Trinidad Tobago 
Burundi Iran Nigeria Turkey 
Cambodia Ireland Norway Uganda 
Cameroon Israel Pakistan Ukraine 
Canada Italy Palestine United Arab 
Chad Jamaica Panama United Kingdom 
Chile Japan Paraguay United States 
China Jordan Peru Uruguay 
Colombia Kazakhstan Philippines Uzbekistan 
Costa Rica Kenya Poland Venezuela 
Croatia Korea, Republic of Portugal Vietnam 
Cyprus Kuwait Puerto Rico Yemen 
Czech Republic Kyrgyzstan Romania Zambia 
Denmark Laos Russian Federation Zimbabwe 
Dominican Republic Latvia Rwanda  
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NOTES 
1  Veenhoven (2011c): section H6.2.3. 
 
2  Four of these studies measured hedonic level using Affect Balance Scales (type A-AB) 
and contentment using the Cantril ladder (type C-BW). The average correlation is ?0.52. 
Two more studies used an Affect Balance Scale for measuring hedonic level but measured 
contentment using responses to questions about perceived realization of wants (type C-
RW). The average correlation is ?0.40 in this case. One more study measured hedonic 
level using average daily mood over 6 weeks as reported in a dairy (type A-ARE) and 
measured contentment with the Cantril ladder (type C-BW). The correlation was only 
?0.26. 
 
3  Veenhoven (2011c), section H6.1.3. 
 
4  Veenhoven (2011c), section H61.2. 
 
5   The full classification of this question in the World Database of Happiness’ collection of 
‘Happiness Measures’ is O-SLW/c/sq/n/11/a. 
 
6   The full classification of this question in the World Database of Happiness’ collection of 
‘Happiness Measures’ is C-BW/c/sq/l/11/a. 
 
7   The ful l code of this indicator in th e World Database of Happiness’ collection of  
‘Happiness Measures’ is: A-AB/yd/mq/2/a. 
 
8   Test for statistical significance infor m us about the chan ce that a pattern observ ed in a 
probability sample also exists in th e population from which that sam ple was drawn. This  
dataset covers alm ost all count ries of the present W orld and therefore we can take the 
observed correlations for what they are. 
 
9   This is not to say that this combination never occurs at the micro level of individuals. 
 
10   Measure code C-RG/cm/mq/v/4/a in the collection ‘Measures of Happiness’ of the 
World Database of Happiness. 
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